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INTRODUCTION
In response to the growing omnipresent tribal interest in conducting gaming operations
(Class I through III), Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 [IGRA].'
The intent of IGRA is twofold. First, gaming is viewed as a means of promoting tribal
economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments. Second, the I G M
provisions are intended to offset the presence of unsavory elements usually associated with
loosely enforced or nonexistent operational control^.^
New Mexico's history of Indian gaming reveals an ongoing and bitter dispute between
tribal governments, state legislators, and private sector interests. Historically, attempts to
effect a viable compact under the auspices of IGRA have resulted in ongoing litigation and
o p p ~ s i t i o n .In
~ March, 1997, the New Mexico Legislature enacted the Indian Gaming
Compact (hereinafter "Compact"), which sets forth provisions for Class I11 gaming operations
in Indian Country within New Mexico.' The Compact, a highly controversial document, was
forwarded to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, who subsequently "declined to approve

' 25 U.S.C. $5 2701-2721 (1988).
See generally S. Rep. No. 104-241 (1996).
Id.
See generally Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kellv, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997); Clark v .
Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995).
N.M. Stat. AM. $11-13-1 (Michie 1997).

or disapprove" the C ~ r n p a c t . ~
Many tribal officials consider Babbitt's lack of action as a sort of "reprieve" for the
gaming tribes, in light of the Compact's cont~oversialnature.' A definitive approval would
sanction the problematic clauses as valid, and a disapproval would force the tribes to cease
operations until a valid (i.e., more acceptable) compact was negotiated. A declination, on
the other hand, is considered an approval by the Secretary "only to the extent that the compact
is consistent with the provisions of [IGRA].

"'

Essentially, the gaming tribes argue that the provisions of the Compact cut against the
intent and requirements of IGRA, and undermine basic principles of tribal sovereignty
Although there are numerous points of contention, e.g., jurisdiction, good faith negotiation, at
particular issue for the tribes are the revenue-sharing scheme and the various regulatory fees
imposed by the State.9 Secretary Babbitt tacitly acknowledged and supported the pueblos'
concerns by documenting his own apprehension regarding these controversial financial
provisions in the Compact. l o
This paper will discuss the controversial elements contained in the New Mexico Gaming
Compact, and conclude that certain regulatory fees and the revenue-sharing plan are actually
See Secretary Babbitt's Letter to the Honorable Wendell Chino at 1
(August 23, 1997).

'See Interview, Ernest Jaramillo, Isleta Pueblo Gaming Commissioner
(October 2, 1997).
25 U.S.C. 5 2710(d)(8)(C).
Interview, supra n. 7.
lo

Letter, supra n.6 at 2-3.

examples of state-imposed taxation of tribal activities conducted in Indian Country. Further,
this paper will present a historical analysis of qui tarn civil proceedings, and demonstrate that
Congress both impliedly and explicitly intended this type of proceeding to remedy financial
disputes, trust relationship violations, and affronts to Indian sovereignty and commerce. In
applying elements of qui tam, this paper will propose a viable future course of litigation that is
legally and procedurally available to gaming tribes, albeit grossly under-utilized. Through a

qui tam action, the pueblos may sue the State of New Mexico in federal court despite the
prohibitions of Seminole" and may seek to recover excess payments as well as unauthorized

tax liabilities which the New Mexico Legislature has impermissibly levied and ultimately
collected. l 2

I. ESTABLISHING A CAUSE OF ACTION
Prior to initiating any type of proceeding in any court, any plaintiff must state a viable and
nonfrivolous claim. In this case, the cause of action is the unauthorized imposition of taxes
upon tribal enterprises by the State of New Mexico.

'I

& Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding that Congress, through
IGRA, could not compel states to submit to suit by tribes. IGRA's attempt to abrogate
1lth Amendment prohibitions against such suits was viewed as an illicit circumvention.)

l2

Some tribes, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe, continue to place their payments to the state
in escrow pending resolution and clarifications of several components of the Compact.
See, e.g., NBC Local News (channel 4), Albuquerque NM, October 29, 1997.

A. THE REVENUE PROVISION IS, BY DEFINITION AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT,
A TAX.

In general, a tax is defined as:
a charge by the government on the income of an individual,
corporation, or trust, as well as the value of an estate or
gift. The objective in assessing the tax is to generate
revenue to be used for the needs of the public. l3
While there are many different types of taxes, the revenue provision appears
to be a franchise tax:

a special privilege to do certain things conferred by government
on individuals or colporations, and which does not belong to citizens
generally of common right. l 4
and,
a tax upon the privilege of existing or the privilege of doing
certain things. An annual tax on the privilege of doing business
in a state. l5

A franchise tax differs from an "income tax" in that it is not a direct tax on income.'"t

does,

however, necessarily involve the computation of the net income of a business, since the tax is
measured by the net income of the business.17

l3

See Black's Law Dictionary 1457 (6th ed. 1990).

I'

Id. at 658.

IS

Id. at 659.

l6

l7

See generally Hoosier Eng'g Co. v. Shea, 205 A.2d 821, 8212 (Vt. 1964)
(emphasis added).
Id. at 823

The New Mexico Compact guarantees Tribes the "exclusive right" to provide Class I11
gaming, with the sole exception being that the State "may" permit linzited gaming (video
poker, slot machines) at racetracks, veterans' organizations, and fraternal orga.nizations.18
Accordingly, the tribal gaming operation can be viewed as a franchise.
To date, New Mexico tribal governments retain a "pure" exclusive right, as there have
been no provisions, regulation, or activation of this alternative use of gaming machines. Even
in the event that the State enacts provisions for non-Indian Class I11 gaming, the general Class
111 activity could still be considered a franchise, as the general public is not granted the
privilege to conduct such activities.
According to the Compact, the revenue provision is 16% of the net win.'9 "Net win" is
calculated by an indirect measure of the annual income, i.e., annual income less prizes paid
out, state regulatory fees, and tribal regulatory feesS2OAdditionally, the revenue paid to the
State is deposited into the General Fund of the State.2' Thus, the disposilion and calculation of
"revenue" owed to the State reflect the classic definition of franchise tax.
During the 43rd legislative session, intent to tax Indian gaming in New Mexico was
inherent in proposed bills submitted to the various House committee^.^^ These proposals

5

IS

N.M. Stat. Ann.

l9

N.M. Stat. AM. 8 11-13-2(3)(A)

20

Id.

2'

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 11-13-2(2).9

22

11-13-2 (l)(A)

See, e.g.. H.B. 872, 43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (NM 1997) (excise tax proposed, as well
as liquor tax, cigarette tax, Corporate Income and Franchise tax, telecommunications
relay service charge, severance tax, etc.); H.B. 741, 43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (NM

appear to be subsumed into the Compact as"revenue"; yet, they provide only a transparent
shield against consideration as a tax.
New Mexico may contend that the revenue scheme is not a tax, but rather a cash payment
"in consideration" to dissuade the state from legalizing further off-reservation gambling.'"
New Mexico may assert that an "exclusive right" was granted the tribes via the Compact, and
that 16% is not unreasonable nor unprecedented compared to other states' granting of
"exclusivity. ""
The New Mexico gaming tribes can counter this argument by a showing that the
guaranteed "exclusivity" is not so exclusive so as to warrant such a high percentage of revenue
sharing. First, the Compact provides an exception for Class 111 gaming (video poker and slot
machines) for racetracks as well as veterans' and fraternal organization^.'^ Second, New
Mexico, while claiming its public policy is to "restrain gambling", actually allows, without

(1997) (graduated revenue payment based on net income similar to N . N . Stat. Ann,
2A-5, Corporate Income and Franchise Tax).
23

24

25

5 7-

Julian Schreibman, Developments in Policy: Federal Indiun h w , 14 Yale L. &
Polly Rev. 353, 361 (1996) (possibility that states will legalize forms of gambling offreservation gives tribes incentive to pay states considerable fees).
See, e.g., Phil Primack, Pequots Sweeten Bridgeport Casino Proposul, Boston I-Ierald ,
September 21, 1995 at 25 (Pequots agreed to pay 20% of revenue from Bridgeport
Casino and 25% from Foxwood Casino).

N.W. Stat. AM. 5 11-13-2 (l)(A). It is interesting to note that "Exclusive" has been
judicially defined as "apart from all others, without the admission of others to
participation." P e o ~ l eon the Complaint of Sainboy v . Sherman, 158 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837
(1965). See also Black's Law Dictionary at 564 (vested in one person alone).

penalty, other fonns of Class Ln gaming in the statenZ6Finally, the New Mexico Criminal
Code provided a complete exculpatory defense to illegal gambling.27 If a gambler initiates
civil action to recover gambling losses, hetshe is exempt from p r s s e c u t i ~ n .Thus.
~ ~ it is
difficult to see that "New Mexico exclusivity" is actually exclusive and therefore appropriate
"consideration" for the 16% revenue sharing. In using the term "exclusive", the State, in
essence, purportedly extended the tribes sole "ownership" to Class I11 gaming within the state
in exchange for 16% revenue. However, this extension was neither warranted, absolute,

accurate, nor justifiable in light of the true circumstances.

B. THE REGULATORY FEES PROPOSED IN N .M. STAT. ANN. 5 11-13-1(4)(E)(5) ARE,
BY THEIR OPERATING INCIDENCE, TAXES; AND, BY DEFINITION, AD
VALOREM TAXES.
In general, the nature of a charge that a law imposes is not determined by the label given,
but by its "operating i n c i d e n ~ e . "Fees
~ ~ imposed by a governmental entity tend to fall into one

26

27

28

29

New Mexico Lottery, N.M. Stat. AM. 9 6-24-1 et seq., (Michie 1995); Statement sf
Gilbert Tafoya, Santa Clara Pueblo, October 2, 1997; Interview, Ernest Jaramillo,
supra n.7 (Santa Fe Downs is broadcasting simulcast horse races).
N.M. Stat. Ann. 9 22-10-14 (Michie 1995).
New Mexico v. Schwartz, 374 P.2d 418 (N.M. 1962).
See Citv of Huntington v. Bacon, 473 S.E.2d 743, 752 (W.Va. 1996) (holding that it is

a universal principle that courts determine and classify taxation on the basis of "realities"
rather than what the tax is "called" in the taxing statute or ordinance). See also Emerson
College v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984) (holding that while
"the intention of the legislature deserves judicial respect, the nature of a monetary
exaction must [ultimately] be determined by its operation rather than its specially
descriptive phrase. ")

of two principal categories: "user fees", based on the rights of the entity as a proprietor of the
instrumentalities used, or "regulatory fees", founded on the police power to regulate particular
businesses or a c t i ~ i t i e s . ~ ~
To distinguish between a fee and a tax, a number of jurisdictions have adopted a test
formulated by Emerson College v. Citv of BostonS3' According to the Emerson College
analysis, a monetary exaction is a fee when (1) the exaction is a charge in exchange for a
particular governmental service which benefits the party paying the exaction in a manner "not
shared by other members of a society"32; (2) the monetary exaction is paid by choice, in that
the party paying the exaction has the option of not utilizing the governnlental service and
thereby avoiding the exaction33;and, (3) the exactions collected are not to raise revenue but to
compensate the governmental entity providing the services for its expenses.34 Moreover, if the
"fee" unreasonably exceeds the value of the specific services for which it is charged, it will be
held to be a tax, and may or may not be ~ a l i d . ~ '
Subsequent to its opinion in Emerson College, the Massachusetts Supreme Court modified

30

See generally Emerson College, 462 N.E.2d 1098.

3'

See generally 462 N .E.2d 1098; see also State of Nawai'i v. Medeiros, 1999 WL 9698
(Hawai'i, January 11, 1999) (adopting a "modified" Emerson College analysis).

32

See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974).

33

See Vanceburg v. Federal E n e r ~ vRegulatorv Comm'n, 57 1 F.2d 630, 644 11.48

(D.C. Cir. 1977).
'4

See Emerson College, 462 N.E.2d at 1105.

35

See Executive Aircraft & Consulting, Inc. v. City of Newton, 845 P.2d 57, 62 (Kan.

1993).

its stance regarding the second identifying factor (voluntariness), reasoning that the element of
choice is not a compelling consideration which can be used to invalidate an otherwise
legitimate charge.36 Other jurisdictions have also either expressly or implicitly declined to
place great value or reliance on the voluntariness of a service in assessing whether a charge is
a tax or a fee.37
In line with this modification, the Hawai'i Supreme Court very recently promulgated a
modified Emerson College factor test for determining whether a charge mandated by a city
ordinance was a tax or a fee.38The factors included: (1) whether the charge applies to the
direct beneficiary of the particular service; (2) whether the charge is allocated directly to
defraying the costs of providing the service; and, (3) whether the charge is reasonably
proportionate to the benefit r e ~ e i v e d . ~The
' Hawai'i Supreme Court, in deciding Medeiros,
determined that because the ordinance allowed receipts of the "fee" to be channeled for "other
law enforcement purposes", the fee in controversy reflected t a ~ a t i o n . ~Additionally,
'
the courl
held that as the "service" not only benefitted society at large but also only benefitted the

36

See Nuclear Metals, Inc. v. Radioactive Waste Mana~ementBoard, 656 N.E.2d 563,
570 (Mass. 1995) (holding that an assessment was a valid fee, despite the fact that the
plaintiff could not decline to pay the fee and remain in business.)

37

See. e.g.. Bloom v. Citv of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 310-11 (Colo. 1989) ("[Wle
decline to engraft a "voluntariness" factor onto the tax-fee distinction. "). This regional
precedent may estop New Mexico from arguing that the consent of the tribes, expressed
by the signing of the Compact, renders the revenue-sharing voluntary and therefore not a
tax.

38

See State of Hawai'i v. Medeiros, 1999 WL 9698 (Hawai'i, January 11, 1999)

39 Id.
40

at *6.

Id. at "6.

payors on a de minimis and incidental level, the fee was incontrovertibly a tax.''
In applying this analysis to the New Mexico Compact

9

11-13-4, Regulation of Class I11

Gaming, several significant and interesting points emerge. First, the "service" of being
"regulated" clearly does not "benefit" the tribes. Rather. a viable argument can be made that
the "service" actually benefits society at large, i.e., to ensure that gaming machines comply
with mandated "pay-off" ratios. With the sophistication and emerging skills of gaming tribes
to internally and effectively manage casino affairs, this "service" appears to be more in line
with goals of protecting gamblers than to assist the tribal operation per se. As in Medeiros,
the tribes are only incidental beneficiaries of the "service." Second, the proceeds of the
regulatory fees go into the General Fund of the State,42with no direction or iinplication of
disposition of monies. When a governmental entity can use the procecds of regulatory fees for
unrelated purposes and or even marginally related purpose^,^' it gives the appearance of
general revenue raising, i.e., the "classic realm of taxation. "44
Third, perhaps the most telling factor in the New Mexico Compact, that of proportionate
reasonableness, appears to be significantly lacking. The particular assesslnenrs in 5 13-1 1-4
are not true and legal regulatory fees. According to Isleta Gaming Commissioner Ernesl

4'

Id. at *7-8. The court never had to reach the third prong, i.e., whether the assessment
was "reasonably proportionate.
"

5 11-13-4(E)(5).

42

N.M. Stat. Ann.

43

See, e.g.. Medeiros, 1999 WL 9698 at *6.

41

Id. at "6-7.

Jaramillo, the State has no direct interaction with any machine in the casinos.''

Rather, each

machine is connected to a central computer which stores essential data. The State's agent to is
to review these printouts, and the agent does not calibrate, enter into, nor individually inspect
each gaming machine and table. Yet, an individual "regulatory fee" is assessed on each
gaming machine and table in the establishn~ent.~"he agent's actual and sanctioned activity
belies the purpose and meaning of "fee", which is defined as a "fixed charge or perquisite
charged as recompense for labor. "47 Thus, it is clear that the regulatory fees mandated in

8

13-11-4 are taxes by definition and analysis.
In general, an ad valorem tax is defined as:
A tax imposed on the value of property.. .a tax levied on property
or an article of commerce in proportion to its value.j8

In New Mexico, the State Constitution provides the power to tax tangible property, at ad
valorem rates not to exceed 33 113%.49 There are several instances in which the New Mexico

Legislature has mandated that business equipment will be subjected to ad valorem
The New Mexico tribal casinos have a variety of gaming machines and tables which are

45

See Interview, supra n.7.

N.M. Stat. Ann. 5 13-11-4. (provides for regulatory fees of $1200 per year per machine
and $3000 per gaming table).
47

See Black's Law Dictionary at 614.

48

See Black's Law Dictionary at 51

49

See N .M. CONST. art VIII,

41

See. e.g., Oil and Gas Production Equipment Ad Valorem Tax Act, N . M . Stat. Ann.
9 7-34-4 (1995).

obviously tangible business property. The average cost of a slot machine is $3700.5' The
regulatory scheme stipulates that casinos will pay $1200 per year per gaming machine, which
totals to approximately 32% of the new sale price. This calculation, when taken in totality
with the above Emerson College analysis, strongly suggests that the individual regulatory
assessments are in fact, ad valorem business taxes.
New Mexico may explain that over nine years (the duration of the Compact), the
"regulatory fee is to increase by 5% every year," ultimately surpassing the constitutionally
mandated ad valorem ceiling of 33 113%. The State may argue that this fact negates the fees'
reclassification as a tax.
The tribes may counter with a description of the State agent's duties as they relate to the
individual machines. If the agent is doing no more per year than the previous year, yet the
tribes are being charged increasingly more, then the payment may not be a regulatory fee. If
in fact these are regulatory fees, the question of reasonableness enters into consideration, and
the tribes can argue that this mandate is not good faith.53 However, if the assessment is indeed

5'

Telephonic Interview, A-Basic Service, Ruidoso NM, October 29, 1997. A-Basic
Service is an approved gaming equipment manufacturer/distributor.

52

N.M. Stat. Ann.

53

Statement of
Tribal representatives were not actively involved in negotiations.
Gilbert Tafoya, supra 11.26; Interview with Ernest Jaramillo, supra n.7. Further, the
Legislature left the gaming issue to the last few hours of the Session. Id. Pressed for
time, the tribes were forced to rely on the representations without much informed
reflection, in order to continue their enterprises. Id. There may have been an element of
duress, with the result of "not signing" being "no gaming in New Mexico." Id. Faced
with the prospect of losing a substantial portion of tribal economy, the tribes were
essentially backed into a comer. See Interview with Ernest Jaramillo, supra n.7.

5

13-11-4 ( 5 ) .

found to be an ad valorem tax, it is not a legitimate exercise of state police power in Indian
Country, and further is unconstitutional because it ultimately exceeds the mandated 33 113 %
ceiling.
C. CAN NEW MEXICO LEGITIMATELY TAX INDIAN GAMING DESPITE IGRA?
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the federal interest requires states to
justify any assertion of authority that would impose any additional burdens on tribes." With
respect to taxation, the issue is whether a state can legitimately claim more than a general
interest in raising revenues to justify taxes.55
In Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, the Ninth Circuit held that a state-imposed
license fee was actually a tax on wagers made at the casino and ordered the slate to relurn the
monies exacted.56 However, the court also opined that state taxation could be allowed under
IGRA, implying that if the tax was not too burdensome, it could be acceptable.57 The court
also suggested that while IGRA did not empower the states

LO impose

a gambling tax on

Indians, it also did not prohibit such a taxUSR
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit again revisited the
state taxation issue with the same parties in interest, but appeared to somewhat soften their

54

See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 (1983).

55

Id. at 336.

56

37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994).

57

Id. at 435.

58

Id. at 433 (holding that tribe's interpretation of IGRA was erroneous because i t equated
the failure to confer authority to tax with a prohibition to tax).

stance toward the potential feasibility of state taxation on activities in Indian Country.59
Within the Tenth Circuit, the Court of Appeals has succinctly ruled that states have only a
minimal interest in taxing tribal gaming operations. and that interest was also significantly
outweighed by federal and tribal i n t e r e ~ t s . ~
Legal incidence of taxation is important in determining whom a state is targeting, and
whether the resultant taxation is permissible. In this case, New Mexico is taxing the gaming
tribes. However, despite IGRA's failure to "empower states with authority to tax" gaming
operations, the United States Supreme Court, in 1995, ruled that taxation of tribes is simply
not ~errnitted.~'
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's 1995 holding "trumps" dicta arising out of
the Ninth Circuit with respect to what IGRA "could" allow and to what extent individual states
"could" tax tribal activities without being "burdensome."62

59

See Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1997). For the
purposes of this paper, it is interesting to note that the Cabazon sought a declaratory
judgment in federal court, requesting that the license fee be declared a tax. Upon
affirmation by the Ninth Circuit that the fee was a tax, the state was ordered to return
the monies. Certainly, seeking a declaratory judgment is one option that the
New Mexico gaming tribes have at their disposal.

See Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. State of Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967,
985 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying preemption analysis to state efforts to tax ~ r i b e ' sbingo
operation).
61

Oklahoma Tax Cornrn'n v . Chickasaw Nation, 5 15 U.S. 450 (1995). See also
and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Lafaver, 31 F.Supp.2d 1298 (D. Kan. 1998).

62

See also Laguna Industries, Inc. v . New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dept., 845 P.2d
167 (N.M.App. 1992) (holding that New Mexico may not impose a gross receipts Lax on
services performed on Laguna Pueblo for a n entity owned by the Pueblo).

11. ONCE A CAUSE OF ACTION IS ESTABLISHED, TRIBES, AS RELATORS, MAY
SUE NEW MEXICO IN FEDEFtAL COURT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF OUI
TAM PROCEEDINGS
A. THE IMPLICATIONS O F SEMINOLE TFUBE V. FLORIDA
The United States Supreme Court, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, held that Congress may
not abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity against suit without the state's consent.63
In Seminole, a statutory provision of IGRA was at issue, i.e., whether Congress could allow
tribes to sue states in federal court if gaming compact negotiations were not conducted in good
faith. C h e f Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, stated that "even when the
Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area.. .the
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article 111, and Article I cannot be
used to circumvent the constitutional limits placed upon federal jurisdiction.

"@

This holding

"constitutionalized" Hans v. Louisiana, in which it was decided that a state may no1 be sued by
its own citizens.65 Justice Rehnquist was of the belief that Hans interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment.
Justice Souter, in dissent, opined that Hans was not a decision about the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment, but rather a holding that as a matter of nonconsticutional federal
commonlaw, the federal courts should honor traditional sovereign immunity and not hear suits

63

116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).

" Id. at
65

1131-32.

134 U.S. 1 (1890).

against states by their own citizens.66 Additionally, Justice Souter believed that Congress was
free to change the sovereign immunity principle behind Hans whenever it wished, so as to
allow individuals to sue their own states in federal court on a federal question claim, and
asserted that this was what Congress had, in fact, legitimately done through the disputed
provision in I G R J ~ . ~ '
The holding in Seminole effectively bars tribes from seeking recourse against states in
federal court. Given the strict limitations of Seminole, there are nevertheless a number of
techniques which can be employed to circumvent Seminole and the Eleventh Amendment
issues. Specifically, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits by t.he federal government
against states in the federal forum, i.e., qui tam suits.

B. QUI TAM ACTIONS -- HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENGLISH
COMMONLAW

"QUZTAM"is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase "qui tarn pro domino rege quam pro si
ipso in hac parte sequitur", meaning "who sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself. '"'
Essentially, a private citizen may join a governmental body in a cause of action if there is a
substantial interest on the part of the governmental body." The governmental entity beconles
the primary plaintiff, and the citizen a relator. A qui turn suit, then, involves a combination of
-

-

-

Id. at 1152-54.
67

Id.

See Black's Law Dictionary 1251.
69

Id.

two distinct interests, one of which is public, the other private. This manner of combining
interests is unique to qui tarnm70

Qui tan has its roots in the formative stages of English law. Since the thirteenth century,
qui tam suits have consolidated royal and private interests. Traditionally, in English law, the

king's interests were a separate and special class of private interests. As sovereignty
developed national status, this notion of the king's interests underwent alterati~n.~'Some of
the king's interests remained immediate and personal, e.g. interest in lands held under royal
tenure, interest in the safety and well-being of his men, and the dignity of the crown.72 Other
interests, directed toward the general well-being of the kingdom, were considered public.
These public interests were frequently expressed in laws.73
Similarly, there were two types of private party interests in qui tam action^.'^ The first
type included the interests of persons who had allegedly suffered a wrong and were suing for

70

71

Although the legal term "joinder" was not utilized in the early English law, it is evident
that qui tan1 was, in part, a type of joinder.
See generally 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 458-69 (1923).

72

See. e.n., Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, 48 Seldon Society, 215 (1931);
Baldwin Tvrel's Case (1214), Select Pleas of the Crown, 1200-1225, 1 Seldon Society
67 (1888).

73

See. e x . , 27 Edw. 3, c.20 (1353); 2 Rich. 2, c.15 (1380); 2 Car. 2 c.32 (1625) (statutes
encouraging commerce); 13 Rich. 2, c.5 (1536); 15 Rich. 2, c.3 (1391) (statutes
regulating jurisdiction); 28 Hen. 8, c.5 (1536) (statutes regulating apprenticeships).

74

See, e.g., Phillips v. Smith, 93 Eng. Rep. 433, Strange 1354 (K.B. 1719).

redress." The second type comprised the interests of common informers, who sued to recover
part of a penalty and were thus viewed as a separate category of "bounty hunters. "7"n
comparison with the aggrieved party, an informer was motivated by the chance of gain, not by
the need for r e c ~ v e r y . ~ '
Initially, qui tam proceedings were not dependent upon statutory authority. An aggrieved
party would bring a qrci tam action to obtain a common law remedy in the royal courts for a
private wrong that also affected the king's interests.7a At that time, a plaintiff could o ~ d ygain
access to the royal courts by alleging a royal interest, as all private wrongs were adjudicated,
at times ineffectively, at the local courts.79 As a result, various techniques were deviscd to
expand the jurisdiction of the royal courts, qui tam being only one example of this legal
maneuvering." By the fourteenth century, royal courts heard suits involving private wrongs

75

76

See 2 Hawkins 369; 3 J. Stephen, Commentaries 011 the Laws of England, 585 (1868).

A commoner's suit belonged to the informer and was not the king's suit. See Kirkham
v. Wheelev, 91 Eng. Rep. 1118, Salkeld 29 (K.B. 1965). The informer's rights to the
penalty did not attach until the suit was filed, whereupon his rights attached absolutely
and to the exclusion of all other informers. 3 Blackstone 160. There were several acts
which permitted common informer suits. See 21 Jac. c.28 (1623) (discussed in
3 Coke Institutes 191); The Common Infor~nersAct, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c.29 (I 951 ).

77

This becomes a relevant distinction between 25 U.S.C. § 81 and other statutes
employing a "whistle blower's" provision.

78

See T. Milsom, Trespass from Henry I11 to Edward 111, Law Q. Rev. 429, n.49, 50

(1958).

2 Holdsworth 369, 449 (some of the techniques included a demand for punitive
damages). Other techniques included allegations of "contru pacem", (Milsom supra
n.78) and allegations of aggravating circumstances which constitute a loss to the King.
Id. at 429.

without requiring the use of techniques such as qui tam. Consequently, as the need for the
non-statutory qui tam proceeding disappeared, the use of it also dirnini~hed.~'However, even
as non-statutory qui tam fell into disuse, statutes began to emerge that permitted private parties
to initiate actions to remedy public wrongs. In some of these statutes, the plaintiff was
required to have suffered some particular injury over and above the public wrong: he had to be
an aggrieved party. In others, any informer could initiate the a c t i ~ n . ~ "
Parliament enacted the first qui tam statute for aggrieved parties in 1400.83 This statute
provided penalties for violations of the statute which limited the jurisdiction of Admiralty
courts. A party improperly sued in this court could counterclaim against his "prosecutor" for
double damages and a fine, payable to the king.84 Consequently, a defendant could recover for
loss and enforce the statute s i m u l t a n e ~ u s l y . ~ ~

See Milson, supra n.78 at 429.
In early English criminal law, enforcement of penal statutes was limited by the lack of
2 L. Radzinowick, A History of the English
an effective public police force.
Criminal Law, 33-167 (1957). To rectify this inadequacy, the courts permitted private
accusers to bring bills to enforce penal laws. See Select Cases Before the King's
Council, 1243-1482, 35 Seldon Society, xxxv et seq (1918). In the fourteenth century,
Parliament enacted the first statute which permitted a private informer to sue for the
violation of a penal law, and gave the private prosecutor a one-fourth share of the
penalty imposed upon conviction of the defendant. See. e . g . , 21 Jac., c.28 (1623)
(repealing numerous obsolete informer statutes from the 1300's). There was never a
requirement that the private prosecutor suffer any individualized injury. Id.

83

$,, A Remedy By Him Who Is Wrongfully Pursued in Ad~niraltyCourt, 2 Hen.
4, c. 11 (1400).

Id.
85

See, e . e . , Bvtola v . Pointel, 73 Eng. Rep. 346, 2 Dyer 159b (K.B. 1558)
19

By the seventeenth century, the qui tam concept had wide acceptance. The two forms of
statutory qui tam, one for Informers and the other for aggrieved parties, although derived from
similar sources, were quite different in terms of procedural limitations. Generally, the
aggrieved party statutes provided remedies, while the informer statutes provided for a share of
the penalty. There was the added confusion as to whether an aggrieved party had to proceed
qui tam if that avenue was open to him." This mass of confusion and complexity continued
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was this legal chaos that the American
colonies inherited when they adopted English laws.
There are two basic views on the American colonial adoption of English law. One view
asserts that the whole of the common law of England was adoptedaR7The conflicting view
asserts the adoption of the cornnlon law of England did not mean the adoption of the whole
common law, but the adoption of the common law as it existed in England prior to some
particular period, so that only the English cases prior to that time were binding upon the
American

The only conclusion that can be drawn from these conflicting authorities is

that the American courts are not bound by the decisions of the English courts, but may look to
these decisions to ascertain the principles and rules of the common law.

There was some question whether an aggrieved party could pursue his commonlaw
remedy without joining the King's interest if the qui turn remedy was available. See.
x ,Ladv Waterhouse v. Bawde, 7 9 Eng. Rep. 116, Cro. Jac. 133 (K.B. 1606)
(judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to sue qui turn).

86

"See, e.g., Chilcott v. Hart, 45 P. 391 (1896). See also Williams v. Miles, 68 N.W.
151 (1903).
People v. Williams, 33 N.E. 849 (1893);Guest v. Revnolds, 68 111.
478 (1873).

Applying these general principles to qui tam, it appears that qui tam, as it existed in
England, could have been received in the United States in three ways." First, the common
law qui tam action by which an aggrieved party sought to redress his injuries may have been
adopted generally along with other portions of the common law.90 Second, specific English
statutes which could be enforced by a qui tam suit may have been adopted by colonial or state
legislatures. Third, American legislatures may have used English law as a model for qui tarn
provisions in American statutes.
There are numerous examples of statutory qui tam in early American history. Many
colonies expressly adopted in toto certain English statutes which could be enforced by qui tarn
p r o c e d ~ r e s . ~In' addition, other statutes were adopted with minor modifications." Moreover,
American legislatures did use qui tarn provisions similar to those found in English law. This
technique was employed in two ways. First, some statutes permitted informers or aggrieved

89

Learned Hand, in Sutherland v. International Ins. Co. of New York, 43 F.2d 969, 970
(3nd Cir. 1930) noted, "This was a qui tam action, well known in England, whence we
imported it... "

This is unlikely. No evidence has ever been found of a commonlaw qui tam suit in
America's early history. Despite the acknowledgment of the commonlaw qui tam
existence in eighteenth century England, its usage in English courts was minimal during
Milson, supra n.78 at 429. This sparse usage may also explain its
that period.
absence in American courts.
"

92

See. e.g., The Miller's Toll in Colonial Comecticut. This provision was enacted in
1672 and was still being enforced in 1828. State v. Bishop, 7 Conn. 24 (1828).

The penalty provisions of the early New Jersey Gaming Law, Act of Feb. 2, 1797, $$
IV, V (1800) ( N . J . Laws 224-25 (repealed 1847) ) were very similar to the English
Gaming Law, 9 Anne c. 14 $ 2 (1710).

parties to sue qui tamrn Second, other statutes provided rewards to informers without
permitting them to sue.% Nevertheless, statutes providing for qiri tam suits were common in
eighteenth century American, and the notion that qui tarn was a joinder of public and private
interests was generally a ~ c e p t e d . ~In
' the nineteenth century, however, the frequency of qui

tam actions decreased. One reason for the reduction stemmed from legislation which nearly
eliminated all qui tam statutes, most particularly those of the informer genre. This apparently
was an attempt to avoid problems with "vexatious and collusive" informers, a common
problem within the English system.%
Judicial interpretation is frequently necessary to determine when statutory phrases
authorize a qui tam proceeding. The problem of statutory interpretation can be broken down
into two elements. First, the legislature's general attitude toward qui tam must be determined.

93

See Tarde v. Benseman, 31 Texas 277 (1868) (tax assessor brought qui tam action for

the violation of a revenue statute). This was similar to the use of qui tam by paid
inspectors to enforce commercial law during the reign of Elizabeth I.
94

See, e.g., State v. Smith, 49 N.H. 155 (1870) (if a statute created a penalty without
providing the means to recover it, a qui tam suit was not authorized). See also Wheeler v
Gouldinq, 79 Mass (13 Gray) 539, 542 (1859) (discussing the distinctions between a qui
tam statute and one which merely provided a reward to anyone who gave informati011
leading to a conviction).

95

See, e . g . , Dickinson v. Potter, 4 Day 340, 342 (Conn. 1810) ("The private party cannol
bring the suit but by joining the state in the prosecution.. . "). In some cases, the court
referred to the state as an indispensable party. See, e . g . , I-Ioughton v. Havens, 6 COM.
305, 307 (1826).

96

Pennsylvania adopted sanctions under 4 Hen. 7, c.20 and 22 (1487); 23 Car. 2, c.9,
reprinted in S. Roberts, Digest of Select British Statutes 138-39 (1847).

Second, assuming a favorable legislative attitude. the court must determine whether the
particular statute before it permits a qui tarn action.
The first element involves the existence of a legislative pronouncement permitting or
precluding qui tam suits. The 1943 congressional reforms of the Informer Act provides an
example of such legislative intent.97 In 1943, the House of Representatives proposed an
amendment to abolish the Act.98 The Senate refused to accept this abolition, but agreed to
limit the Act.99 In 1960, the Act was again the subject of congressional concern, but as in
1943, the qui tan1 provision was retained.'@' Such activity indicates both an awareness and an
approval of the qui tam provisions in the Informers Act.'''
Once it has been determined that a legislature has an announced policy in favor of qui tan1
suits (or at least has not precluded such suits) the question then becomes in what instances are
such suits authorized. As discussed previously, qui tam statutes either expressly or impliedly

97

99

H.R. 1203, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). During the course of debate 011 the
amendment, the False Claims Act was referred to as the Informers Act. 89th Csng.
Rec. 10751, 10845 (1943).

89 Cong . Rec. 10752 (1943).

'@'In fact, no substantive changes were made in the Act.
lo'

American judicial attitudes toward qui tam were also mixed, as evidenced by Justice
Black's opinion in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 3 17 U.S. 537, 541 (1 943). In
reversing the lower court's decision, Justice Black stated, "stalutes providing for a
reward to informers which do not specifically authorize or forbid the informer to
institute the action are construed to authorize him to sue. " Id. at 541, n.4.

give the informer or an aggrieved party the right to institute proceedings.lo2 A clear
implication of the right to sue qui tam arises when a share of the penalty is given to one who
will sue for it.

C . QUI TAM SUITS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Federal statutes continue to provide that Indian interests may be protected through the
i.nstitution of qui tam litigation, i.e., 25 U.S.C. $ 175 and 25 U.S.C.

3 81. Interestingly,

these two statutes arose during the same era (post-Civil War), and appear to fit with the
English law notions of "informer" and "aggrieved party" standing to bring claims.

3 175 provides that:
In all States and Territories where there are reservations
or allotted Indians, the United States attorney shall represent
them in all suits at law and equity.
81 provides that:
No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians, or
individual Indians not citizens of the United States, for the payment or
delivery of any money or other thing of value, in present or in prospective,
or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, or any other

Io2

The courts in Bush v. R e ~ u b l i cof Texas, 1 Tex. 455 (1946) and Campbell v . Board of
Pharmacy of New Jersey, 45 N.J.L. 241 (1883) dealt with statutes which specifically
provided for enforcement by qui tam suits. The strength of an implication, however,
varies with the wording. Because the implication must be clear, a presumption exists
against the presence of implied authority. Courts have permitted qui tam actions
to be brought on the following wordings: "to anyone who would prosecute
therefore", Chicago v. Alton R . R . v. Howard, 287 Ill. 414 (1865); "one
who would sue for the same", Adams v. Commonwealth, 1 Woodward Dec. 417,
(D. Pa. 1866); "to the use of the informer", Adams qui tam v. Woods, 6 IJ.S. (2
Cranch) 336 (1804); "one-half to the use of the informer". Payne v. Coursev, 20 Ga.
585 (1856).

person in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their
lands, or to any claims growing out of. or in reference to, annuities,
installments, or other moneys, claims, demands, or thing, under laws
or treaties with the United States, of official acts of any officers thereof,
or in any way connected with or due from the United States, unless such
contract or agreement be executed and approved as follows:
First. Such agreement shall be in writing, and a duplicate of it delivered
to each party.
Second. It shall bear the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs indorsed upon it.
Third. It shall contain the names of all parties in interest, their residence
and occupation; and if made with a tribe, by their tribal authorities, the
scope of authority, and the reason for exercising that authority, shall be
given specifically.
Fourth. It shall state the time when and place where made, the particular
purpose for which made, the special thing or things to be done under it,
and, if for the collection of money, the basis of the claim, the source
from which it is to be collected, the disposition to be made of it when
collected, the amount or rate per centum of the fee in all cases; and
if any contingent matter or condition constitutes a part of the contract
or agreement, it shall be specifically set forth.
Fifth. It shall have a fixed limited time to run, which shall be distinctly stated
All contracts or agreements made in violation of this section shall be null
and void, and all money or other thing of value paid to any person by any
Indian Tribe, or anyone else, for or on his or their behalf, in account of
such services, in excess of the amount approved by the Commissioner and
Secretary for such services, may be recovered by suit in the name of the
United States in any court of the United States, regardless of the amount in
controversy; and one-half thereof shall be paid to the person suing for the
same and the other half shall be paid into the Treasury for the use of the
Indian or tribe by or for whom it was so paid.lo3

In the apparent absence of any guiding legislative intent, this statutory provision has
interesting implications. First, if read in a traditional "informer" context, anyone could
bring suit as a private attorney general on behalf of the United States without joining the
tribes as an indispensable party. The informer would receive half' of the recovered

25 U.S.C.

$5

175 and 81 may have had the seeds of their origin planted by the trade and

intercourse laws,lOj although qui tam proceeding were not formulated in the successive Acts
per se. President George Washington, in the early 1790's proposed a system of "trading
houses" or "factories" whereby bitter and unfair competition by private sector interests would
be ameliorated, thus eliminating fraud and extortion.Io5 The Supreme Court, in 1960:
acknowledged the historical fact that Indians were shielded from "artful scoundrels inclined to
make sharp bargains". lo'
As the nation grew, so did trade opportunities and commerce. As such, Lhe fiduciary
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes became more clearly defined. The
duration of the Civil War proved to be a trying Lime for the federal government. 'There were

money, with the other half going in trust to the tribe. It is only by virtue of the trust
relationship that tribes would benefit from the actions of a private informer. However,
if read in an "aggrieved party" context, the tribe would essentially recover all of
monies, with half going directly to the relator, and the other half going indirectly to
the tribe through trust. Thus, from a historical perspective, this is an unusual qui tarn
statute.
lW

'05

IM

Some courts have held that the Indian Nonintercourse Act, codified at 25 U .S.C. Q: 177,
is the statutory recognition of the trust relationship. See, e . g . , Joint Tribal Council of'
the Passarnaquoddv Tribe v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 649, 667 (D. Me 1975), aff'd 528
F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
See cenerally Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties at 100-102 (1994). It is
equally significant that during this era, the southern states, led by Georgia, were
adamant about asserting state control over Indian affairs, including trade, despite the
ratification of the United States Constitution. Thus, the trade and intercourse laws were
also designed to counter state movements toward conlrol over the tribes within their
boundaries. Id.
See McMorran v. Tuscarora Nation of Indians, 362 U.S. 60-8 (1 960).

numerous miscarriages of justice and fraud in relation to governmental contracts, and Indian
commerce was no exception. Io7
However, the political climate did not boil over until the introduction of Andrew Johnson
into the public arena.lo8 The Republican party nominated Andrew Johnson in 1864 to run as
Vice President because he was a Democrat and a Southerner, and they hoped that 11e would
help carry some of the crucial border states. '09 When Johnson assumed the presidency after
Lincoln's assassination, he and Congress were immediately in direct conflict. While
Congress' goal was to punish those responsible for secession and rebellion, enforce civil rights
and normalize economic rehabilitation,Il0 Johnson was overly generous with pardons and
vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as well as other Reconstruction bills."' A number of
historians have described Andrew Johnson as committed to white supremacy as well as to

Io7

William Belknap, Secretary of War under President Grant, was charged with selling
lucrative trader post positions, receiving approximately $12,000 annually through a
middleman. When discovered, Belknap was impeached, and he resigned hours after his
impeachment. See generally Daniel Pollitt, Sex in the Oval Office and Coverup Under
Oath: Impeachable Offenses? 77 N.C.L.Rev., 259, 272 (1998). At that lime,
Indian affairs were directed under the Secretary of War.

'08

The Court of Claims, in United States v. Kiowa. Comanche, and Apache
Tribes of Indians, stated, "[tlhe tenure of President Andrew Johnson" marked an era
"when the animosity of Congress toward a President was the greatest this country has
ever experienced. " 470 F.2d 1369 (Ct. C1. 1973).

Io9

See generally Steve Tally, Bland Ambition 134 (1992).

"O

See generally Walter Erlich, Presidential Impeachment: An American Dilemma (1974).

"I

Id. at 56-57

States' exclusive power to define the rights of &I
inhabitants.'I2
The situation reached a climax when Johnson tried to replace Secretary of War Stanton
(who had been tough on the South) with Lorenzo Thomas, a Southern sympathizer.ll"hortly
before Johnson fired Stanton, Congress, aware of the animosity between Stanton and Johnson,
enacted a law which stipulated that Senate advice and consent was required for the removal of
any appointment that had required Senate advice and consent for initial appointment."'
Despite the Tenure of Office Act, Johnson fired Stanton and appointed Thomas. After weeks
of debate and impeachment trial, Johnson was acquitted by one ~ o t e . ~ ~ ~ i m u l t a n e oduring
usly
this era, the United States Supreme Court worked in combination with Congress to limit
presidential powers and in particular, place control of Indian affairs in the hands of Congress,
despite Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase's expansive view of federal authority over Native
Americans. 1 1 6 Justice Chase himself appeared to have a personal agenda. It is alleged that
Justice Chase, angry at losing the Republican Party presidential nomination to Ulysses Grant,
did everything he could to undermine the impeachment proceedings by stressing the judicial
rather than the political content of the trial, thereby damaging the Republicans' efforts to place

See, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Salmon P. Chase and Constitutional Politics, 22 Law
& Soc. Inquiry 459, 476 (1997).

ll2

'I3

Id. at 57.
Tenure of Office Act, Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 154, $ 1, 14 Stat. 430.

'IS

See 2 Trial of Andrew Johnson 485-98 (Washington, Govt. Printing Office 1868).
See. e.?. Lone Wolf v . Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1871).

28

Johnson's offenses in a political context where they rightfully belonged.Il7 Nevertheless,
upon his election, President Grant appointed two new Justices to the Supreme Court who
continually and (speculatively) deliberately worked against Chase.'Is Thus, between Johnson,
Grant, Congress, and the internally fractious Supreme Court, the office of the President was
ultimately bereft of the power to independently deal with Indian affairs.""

25 U.S.C.

8 81 was enacted on May 21,

1872 as a "bounty hunter" provision. 120 A year

earlier, in 1871, the treaty era had ended.I2' The Commissioner of Indian Affairs had reported
to Congress that "The Indian Tribes of the United States are not sovereign nations, capable of

-

Y

making treaties, as no e of them have an organized government of such inherent strength as
would secure a faithful obedience of its people in the observance of compacts of this

'I7

See Les Benedict, supra note 112 at 477-78.

'I8

Id. at 485.

'I9

25 U.S.C. § 71 essentially provided that Congress could maintain a direct interest
in the affairs of Indian Nations independent of the President's authority and independent
of the treaty process.

I2O

This statute arose from the combined effect of the Act of Mar. 3, 1871 and Act of May
21, 1872, ch. 117, 17 Stat. 136. This was not unheard of, as a "bounty hunter" statute
had been enacted by Congress in 1863 to remedy defense procurement fraud.
Act
of Mar. 2, 1863, c.67, 12 Stat. 696. The False Claims Act was re-enacted at 36 U.S.
Rev. Stat. $3 3490-3494 (1875), later codified as 3 1 U.S.C. $8 231-235 (1975) and
again recodified at 31 U.S.C. $8 3729-31 (1982).
187 1

12'

The Appropriations Act of Mar. 3c1981, ch. 135, 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566. In reality,
the shift in policy did not originate in the belief that Indian tribes were no longer
Robert N . Clinton et al., American
sovereign entities, but in institutional jealousy.
Indian Law: Cases and Materials, 147 (3rd ed. 1983) (describing the political scene
which suggests that the House of Representatives had grown jealous and dissatisfied
with the Senate's control over shaping Indian policy through its treaty power.) The
House of Representatives had sought to impose its will over federal Indian policy by
cutting off funds for treaty negotiations as early as 1867. Id. at 148.

character. "I"

At that time, Indians were not considered citizens who had stnading to bring

claims in the nation's courts.lu

5 81 may have developed as a legitimate vehicle to address

tribal legal claims in fulfillment of self-assumed trust relationship responsibilities, despite its
paternalistic and insulting underpinnings. However, because

5 81 and 9

175 had historically

been read by the courts, government agencies, and U.S. Attorneys as implying a discretionary
power rather than a mandatorv duty to represent, there is a distinct possibility that many
meritorious tribal claims have been lost due to anti-Indian sentiment, political expediency, and
the disastrous effects of Manfiest Destiny principle. Sadly, the United Srates Supreme Court
has been an inconsistent advocate of tribal sovereignty, seeming to view tribal rights against a
backdrop of changing conditions (demographic, social, political, economic) and rhe
expectations they create in the minds of non-Indians.
D. THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION O F QUI TAM LITIGATION
Historically, qui tam proceedings in cases involving tribes have been sparingly initiated,
and almost exclusively in the area of gaming management contracts.'24 The court in Steele
appeared to offer an unsolicited hint that qui tam actions under 25 U.S.C.

9 81 could provide a

122

Cornm'r Ind. Aff. Ann. Rep., H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 1, 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. 448
(1869).

123

In fact, they were not considered citizens at all

'24

See generally United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208 (7th Cir.
1995); United States ex ref. Mosay v. Buffalo Bros. Management Inc., 20 F.3d 739
(7th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel.Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gambler's S u ~ o l y Inc,,
,
925 F.Supp. 658 (D.S.D. 1996); United States ex rel.Steele v . 'I'urn Key Gaming. Inc.,
1997 WL 155405 (March 18, 1997, D . N . D . ) ; United States ex rel. Gulbronson v. D &
J Enter., 1993 WL 76789 (December 23, 1993, W . D . Wis.).

remedy for tribes who wished to contest revenue-sharing provision^.'^
In order to proceed with a qui tarn action against New Mexico, the gaming tribes must first
establish that there is a substantial interest on the part of the federal government. Certainly, a
substantial interest in the gaming issue is demonstrated by virtue of the trust re1ati0nship.l~~
In 1997, the Chemehuevi Tribe sought to invoke $ 175 against the State of California
because they felt that the State was not negotiating in good faith.127 The tribe requested that
the U.S. Attorney and the Department of Justice represent them, reasoning that Seminole had
left any tribe dissatisfied with the progress of negotiations without a clear legal

The

U.S. Attorney declined, and the Department of Justice never responded to the tribe's
request.'29 The tribe then filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United
States, the Department of Justice, Janet Reno in her official capacity, and the I.J.S. Attorney in
his official ~ a p a c i t y . " ~The federal defendants inoved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiclion,

1997 WL 155405 at *2 [FN2]. "This statute also provides a remedy for violations of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. "
126

See Secretary Babbitt's Letter at supra n.6 at 2 (...because of the Department's trust
responsibility, we seek to ensure that the cost to the tribe is appropriate in light of the
benefit conferred on the Tribe..."); see also Montana Bank of Circle. N.S. v. United
States, 7 Ct. C1. 601 (Ct. C1. 1985); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d
981 (Ct. C1. 1980) (holding that where federal government has an interest in tribal
economics, there is a fiduciary duty toward such economics); Pvramid Lake Paiute
Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F.Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972) (Secretary of Interior
must fulfill fiduciary duties to tribes).

127

See Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 987 F.Supp. 804 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

128

Id. at 805-06.

Iz9

Id. at 806.

claiming the district court did not have the authority to require the Attorney General or the
U.S. Attorney to exercise prosecutorial di~cretion.'~'In a surprise move, the court upheld the
tribe's contention that the combination of 25 U.S.C. § 175 and the fiduciary relationship
between the United States and Indian tribes provided a limited exception to absolute
prosecutorial discretion.13*In essence, the court held that the United States has a mandatory
duty to sue a state on a tribe's behalf when tribes have no other legal remedy by which to
obtain benefits Congress intended them to have.133The court further stated that whatever the
full extent of the fiduciary relationship, it "should include a duty to represent" tribes in
situations where, absent representation, the tribes will have no legal remedy.134 In solidifying
the opinion, the court examined the legislative intent and history of IGRA and reasoned that
the history "compels the conclusion that a federal remedy is necessary to preserve Congress'
balancing of tribal and state interests and to secure the benefits of IGRA to the tribes.

13'

Id.

13'

Id. at 807.

lJ3

135

Id. Although § 175 has been interpreted in only a number of cases, no court had found
a mandatory duty on behalf of the federal government to represent an Indian tribe.
However, it is only dicta that the duty is purely discretionary. See Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v . Morton, 499 F.2d 1095, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rincon Band of Mission
Indians v. Escondido Mut. Water Co., 459 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1972). Only one
case prior to Chemehuevi analyzed circumstances under which the U.S. Attorney might
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d
have a duty to sue on behalf of tribes.
1476 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that neither 5 175 nor the fiduciary relationship limited
the Attorney General's discretion to refuse to assert tribal claims to certain water
rights.)

Id. at 809, citing S.Rep. No. 100-446 at 2-3, reprinted in 1988 U . S . C . C . A . N .3071,
3071-72. The court also asserted that Congress recognized the potential unfairness in

Assuming that there is a mandatory duty for federal representation, the tribe itself, at first
glance, should be the relator. However, the Eighth Circuit recently ruled that long as the
relator's and the tribe's interests are identical, a tribal representative, tribal official, or private
citizen could invoke a qui tam action without joining the tribe.'36 Each Tribal Council can
determine whether it should join in one case or whether separate actions should be taken, As
this New Mexico case would be a case of first impression, there is no prior precedent or
guiding principle to follow. 13'

E. 25 U.S.C. § 81
25 U.S.C.

5 81, as previously

stated, provides a statutory qui tam cause of action remedy

for breaches against the tribe, i.e., "all money paid.. .by any tribe.. .in excess of the amount

the compacting process and the potential for subjecting tribes to unwarranted state
control. 134 Cong. Rec. 24, 036-27; 25, 376; 25, 380-81. But see United States
v. 1020 Electronic Gambling Machines, 1999 WL 144810 (Jan. 19, 1999, E.D. Wash.)
(declining to follow Chemehuevi).
'36

'"

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19; see also United States ex rel. Steele v. Turn Key Gaming, Inc.
135 F.3d 1249 (8th Cir. 1998).
New Mexico gaming tribes can establish a fiduciary interest on the par1 of the United
States based upon the government's interest in economic development. Even if the
United States fails to provide a U.S. Attorney to actually and direclly conducl the
litigation due to scarcity of litigation funds, the tribes may still proceed with [he case
in the United States' name and hire a private attorney. The United States also has [he
option of hiring a private attorney to litigate on its behalf. Typically, the relator's
attorney and the government attorney work together in preparing the case for litigation.
See generally Evan Caminker, The Constitutionalily of Qui Tam Actions, 99 Yale L.J.
341 (1989). In any event, the U.S. Attorney is definitively estopped from assuming
an adversarial stance against the tribes because of the inherent nature of qui u r n
litigation. The qui tam litigation also designs a paradigm in which the U.S. Attorney's
adversarial stance would present a conflict of interest for the U.S. government.

approved by the Commissioner and Secretary.. .may recover by suit in the name of the United
States.. . " This statute has been upheld as constitutional. 138 Although the majority of cases
invoking

9 81 have been against private management companies, there is no reason to believe

that such action would be barred against states, or that a state could not meet the definition of
'person' as mandated in the statute.
In United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute, the district court
originally held that qui tan2 actions are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and states are
not protected from actions brought on behalf of the United States.13g Further, the court ruled
that although the word "person" is ordinarily construed to exclude a sovereigi~when
interpreting a statute, this reading may be disregarded if the put-pose, subject matter, context,
or legislative history indicate an intent to bring a state or nation within the scope of the law.I4'
Several months later, however, the Court of Appeals, in an inlerlocutory appeal,
overturned this ruling, holding that states are not "persons" under the False Claims Act.I4'
The appellate court opined that Congress did not clearly define "person

'38

"

in the False Claims

See, e . p . , United States ex rel. Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v.
Pan American Management Co., 606 F.Supp. 1200 (D.C.Mim. 1985).
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F.Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1998).

140 Id.
14'

United States v. SCS Business & Technical Institute, 1999 W L 178713 (April 2, 1999
D.C. Cir.). But see United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agencv of Na~ural
Resources, 162 F.3d 195 (2nd Cir. 1998); United States cx rel. Zissler v . Regents of
the Univ. of M i m . , 154 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1998) (both federal circuits holding that
states are "persons" under the False Claims Act.)

Act despite its numerous chances to do so via amendments to the Act.14' Thus, in deference
to the traditional sovereignty of states and in recognition that other circuits have ruled
differently, the court declined to impute "person" as including states.IJ3
This very recent holding can be distinguished from a proposed course of litigation under
the auspices of

3 81. Unlike the False Claims Act, where defendants can arise from a diverse

assortment of parties, e.g., companies, corporations, private individuals, etc., the state is the
sole entity that is a possible respondenrldefendant in compact issue disputes. Congress never
intended the tribes to seek approval, negotiate. or otherwise formulate a gaming compact with
any other entity. Because the contracts with states are under the authority and procedures sf

5 81, it is clear that

"person" must refer to states in the ease of garning compact disputes.

In any qui tam action, there is an issue of the relalor's standing, i.e., whether Article 111 of
the Constitution permits a federal court to entertain a qui tam action brought by someone
whose only stake in the suit is bounty.144 The offer of a bounty as a "salary" may create an
entitlement upon which a suit in federal court can be based without violating Article 111, since
one deprived of a salary has suffered the type of injury that is a traditional basis for seeking
redress.14' However, it is entirely another matter for Congress to provide a blanket statute that

14*

See SCS Business, 1999 WL 178713 at *3-5.
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Id. at " 5 .

144

See ex ref. Mosay, 20 F.3d at 742. However, this might only be applicable if the

relator were an "informer", not an "aggrieved party."
145

comments, n.113.

See generally Luian v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

allows anyone in the United States to sue to enforce the rights of others.'46 If a litigant has not
been injured, he generally has no standing to sue.ld7

A fairly recent Seventh Circuit decision qualified standing and qrci tarn actions brought by
the United States on behalf of tribes.14' In ex rel. Hall, the court held that the United States,
for the purposes of 8 81 proceedings, was the plaintiff for standing purposes. 149 Further, the
court reasoned that § 81 reflects "what has been comnlonly referred to as the unique trust
relationship between the United States and the I n d i a n ~ . " ~As such, it is the lJnited States, as
trustee, who owns the rights conferred by

81, and thereby suffers the same and sufficient

injury-in-fact as the tribes who suffered the direct injury. Is'
Further, if the government can be said to own, or hold in trust, the rights that 25 U.S.C.
$ 81 confers, then the relator in a § 81 action could be thought of as an assignee.'" In a trust

146

147

ex rel. Mosav, 20 F.3d at 742.

See Luian, 504 U.S. at 562; Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th
Cir. 1990).

148

United States ex rel. Hall v . Tribal Development Corp., 49 F.3d 1208 (7th Cir.
1990).

149

Id. at 1213.

Is0

Id. at 1214, citing Oneida Countv, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N . Y . , 479 U.S.
226, 247 (1985).

Is'

Id. at 1214.

&'51

United States ex rel. Kellv v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993). What is
somewhat disconcerting is that one District Court likened the trust relationship
provisions to those of a "spendthrift" trust, insidiously implying that even now, Indians
"need" management of business affairs. Keechi v . Ilnited States, 604 F.Supp. 267
(D.D.C. 1984).

situation, the government, as the trustee, has a right to sue a state while the tribe, as
beneficiary, does not beneficiary, does not. '"

If the plaintiff, the United States, is correct

that the Compact yields less income to the tribe than would a lawhl compact not marred by
taxation and in conformity with IGRA, the monetary recovery would exceed a simple "bounty"
and the requirements of Article I11 would be
The United States has immense powers under

9 81 to enforce and validate contracts. It is

interesting to note that Secretary Babbitt himself, under

5 81, apparently has the autl~orityto

sever undesirable portions from the Compact, while leaving the New Mexico gaming business
intact and pera able.'^' Similarly, tribes have the authority to modify contracts without
simultaneous conditional Secretarial appr0va1.l~~

On its face, the New Mexico Compact appears to meet the five stipulations under (i 81
The Compact is in writing; it is approved by the Secretary of the Interior; it qualifies the
names and scope of authority for all parties; it has specific procedures for performance; and, it
has a nine year limitation. Nevertheless, the Compact terms can still be litigated under the
auspices of paragraph 3 and 5:
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Second. It shall bear the approval of the Secretary of the

& ex rel. Mosav, 20 F.3d at 742.
Id. at 743.
Rollins & Presbrev v. United States, 23 Ct.CI. 106 (Ct.CI. 1888) (a contract that
provides for the performance of several acts may be approved as to one or more than
one of them, with the effect of validating the contract for the part approved and no
more).

&'SI

Littell v. Morton, 369 F.Supp 41 1 (D.C.Md. 1974).

Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs indorsed upon it.
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Fourth. It shall state...the special thing or things to be done under
it, and, if for the collection of money, the basis of the claim...

In utilizing this statute for maximum benefit, one must read the statute "horizontally", i.e., the
two paragraphs must be read in tandem. First, Secretary Babbitt questioned the
reasonableness of the regulatory fees and the high rate of revenue-sharing. He used this as a
basis to decline to approveldisapprove the Compact. '57 A declination of approvalldisapproval
implies that the Secretary only approved those provisions which were consistent with IGRA,
i.e., the portions of the Compact that were acceptable and within the bounds of the spirit of
IGRA and Congressional intent.
Second, taxation of tribes is not authorized by either IGRA or Supreme Court precedent.I5'
It is obvious why revenue-sharing and unreasonable fees, being a source of contention for the
Secretary, were not given a blanket approval. However, if the revenue-sharing and the
regulatory fees are determined to be, in fact, taxes, the basis of the claim for money is not
only invalid but illegal under the scope of IGRA.lSyThus, revenue-sharing payments (AKA
franchise taxes) and regulatory fees (in excess of a reasonable fee) can be recovered by qui

15'See
- Secretary Babbitt's Letter supra n.6 at 2-3
'58

See IGRA, 527 10(d)(4); IGRA §2710(d)(3)(c)(iii); Chickasaw, 515 U.S. 450
(1995).

159 As

stated previously, the Secretary has the authority to sever undesirable portions of
a contract while keeping tge contract and the performance operable. This is
certainly one option that the Secretary has available but to date has not employed.
See Rollins, 23 Ct.CI. 106.
--

tam action under the authority of 25 U.S. C. § 81.
New Mexico could, along this line of reasoning, produce numerous cases in contract law
which hold that "if A makes an offer to B and B remains silent, there is no contract.

The

State may argue that IGRA violates established contract law (i.e, may raise a separation of
powers issue if Congress overrules decades of contract law stare decisis), and that the
Secretary's inaction voided the contract. In this argument, however, the State wold have to
grossly minimize the sovereign authority of the tribes. In taking this position, the State would
be forced to contend that tribes have no standing to negotiate compacts and conduct business
a b initio without the Secretary of the Interior's direct input, i.e., if the Secretary is THE
signatory and legal authority before a compact is valid, then why deal with tribes at a11?16'
This argument, while conceivable, would present a very unpopular, racist, controversial, and
archaic stance which dates back to the Jacksonian era (1825-1834) when tribal sovereignty was
whittled away and carved into conformity with the needs of a white majority.
Tribes may counter that the Second Restatement of Contracts recognizes silence as a mode
of acceptance in several instance^.'^' As applicable to this case, the tribes may argue that the
Secretary's prior conduct in accepting other compacts makes silence reasonable as a form of
acceptance (although it is a qualified acceptance). The test is whether a person (tribelstate)

See generally A. Prescott v. Jones, 69 N.H. 305 (1898).
Essentially, the State would argue that in the case of gaming compacts, approval is
equal to acceptance.

could reasonably expect to be notified if a contract was rejected.'"' Thus, the tribe could argue
that IGRA is not meant to usurp contract law or judicial powers. Rather, the provision in
IGRA is only to serve notice that an express rejection will be executed in writing, if
appropriate.
Secretary Babbitt apparently would prefer that Conlpact issues be negotiated and resolved in
a less harsh manner.'@ However, given the nature and quality of past "negotiations",
allegations of New Mexico's bad faith, the omnipresent influence of private sector interests,
and devious legislative intent, Babbitt's goal seems unattainable at this juncture.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it appears that there are sufficient grounds to contest thc revenue provisions
of the Compact through a statutory qui tam action under the auspices of 25 U.S.C. $5 175 and

81. Although this type of proceeding would be a case of national first impression, there is
suitable basis to justify standing, jurisdiction, and cause of action. Qui tam actions can serve
to enhance and advance the substantial federal fiduciary interest in tribal sovereignty,
particularly in the area of tribal economic development.
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See Secretary Babbitt's Letter supra n.6 at 3 .
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